Picturing words: The semantics of speech balloons by Maier, Emar
Picturing words: the semantics of speech balloons∗
Emar Maier
Theoretical Philosophy/MILLC, University of Groningen
e.maier@rug.nl
Semantics traditionally focuses on linguistic meaning. In recent years, the Super Linguistics
movement has tried to broaden the scope of inquiry in various directions, including an extension
of semantics to talk about the meaning of pictures. There are close similarities between the
interpretation of language and of pictures. Most fundamentally, pictures, like utterances, can
be either true or false of a given state of affairs, and hence both express propositions (Zimmer-
mann, 2016; Greenberg, 2013; Abusch, 2015). Moreover, sequences of pictures, like sequences
of utterances, can be used to tell stories. Wordless picture books, comics, and film are cases in
point. In this paper I pick up the project of providing a dynamic semantic account of pictorial
story-telling, started by Abusch (2012) and continued by Abusch & Rooth (2017); Maier &
Bimpikou (2019); Fernando (2020).
More specifically, I propose here a semantics of speech and thought bubbles by adding event
reference and event modification to PicDRT. To get there I first review the projection-based
semantics for pictures (section 1), noting the fundamental distinction between symbolic and
iconic meaning that makes speech bubbles especially interesting (section 2). I then review the
dynamic PicDRT framework for pictorial narratives (section 3), add events (section 4), and
propose an account of speech bubbles as quotational event modification (section 5). I end with
a brief look at other conventional event modifiers in comics such as motion lines (section 6).
1 Picture semantics
As a first pass at bringing our formal semantics toolkit to the study of pictures, we might say
a picture expresses the proposition consisting of the set of all those worlds that ‘look like’ the
picture. However, just as sentences with indexical elements express propositions only relative to
a context of utterance (Kaplan, 1989), so pictures are usually assumed to express propositions
relative to a viewpoint (formally, a unit vector located somewhere in space time, specifying from
where, when, and in what direction we’re observing/picturing the world). With this notion of
a viewpoint we can introduce the notion of a projection function, which will then replace the
vague (and problematic, Goodman 1976; Greenberg 2013) notion of resemblance in our first
rough characterization. In short, a projection is a recipe for turning a 3D scene (part of a
world seen from a viewpoint) into a 2D representation. For example, using linear perspective
digital photography projection, as implemented in my phone, we can project the actual world
w, from a viewpoint v facing the Keizersgracht from the bridge onto a digital photo, (1a). With
a different projection algorithm, pi2, treating projection lines coming from edges and surfaces
somewhat differently, we can map the same world, from more or less the same viewpoint, onto
a 2D drawing:1
∗Many thanks to Sofia Bimpikou and the anonymous AC reviewers, and to the workshop organizers. This
research is supported by NWO Vidi Grant 276-80-004 (FICTION).
1Photo from https://pixabay.com/photos/amsterdam-keizersgracht-netherlands-686460/, drawing
from https://pixabay.com/illustrations/amsterdam-keizersgracht-netherlands-3609378/.
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(1) a. pi1(w, v) = b. pi2(w, v
′) =
We can now more precisely define the proposition expressed by a picture as the inverse of the














In other words, the meaning of a picture, relative to a fixed viewpoint v and projection function
pi provided by the model, is the set of worlds w that could be projected onto that picture from
viewpoint v. However, when we interpret a picture we often don’t have any prior, independent
access to the spatio-temporal viewpoint the artist used to create her projection (this is especially,
but not exclusively, true for fictional depictions). Instead, we may infer certain properties of
the viewpoint from the picture itself, just like in interpretation we try to infer properties of the
world depicted. To model this we use a more abstract, two-dimensional, or centered, notion of
content, akin to a Kaplanian character, or its diagonal. Generally, for any picture α, interpreted
in a model providing a projection function pi alongside a set of worlds and a set of viewpoints
(Rooth & Abusch, 2017):
(3) JαK = {〈w, v〉 pi(w, v) = α}
2 Iconic vs. symbolic meaning
The key differences between pictorial and linguistic meaning are in how they express proposi-
tions. Linguistic meaning is considered mostly symbolic (i.e., depending on an arbitrary, purely
conventional lexicon), and compositional (i.e., depending on a grammar specifying how mean-
ings of complex expressions are built up out of constituent meanings). Pictorial meaning by
contrast is mostly iconic, i.e. representing by virtue of some more or less natural, structure
preserving transformation relation (like our projection above), and holistic, i.e. independent of
grammatical constituent structure.
However, on closer inspection, many aspects of language turn out to be more or less iconic
(onomatopoeia (Henderson, 2016) , co-speech gestures (Schlenker, 2018) , sign language clas-
sifiers (Davidson, 2015), etc.). Quotation and quotatives, especially in spoken language, are
often analyzed as iconic as well: in quoting, a reporter ‘demonstrates’ a previous speech act by
producing something ‘similar’ (Clark & Gerrig, 1990; Recanati, 2001; Davidson, 2015).
On the other side, the degree to which certain drawing or even photography and film styles
are purely iconic has also been debated. Linear perspective drawing, for instance, is arguably
not so ‘natural’ that early medievals were able to apply it. Moreover, it’s not clear that the
visual system itself follows linear perspective projection in the interpretation of our surroundings
(Giardino & Greenberg, 2015; Greenberg, 2013).
A rather different instance of symbolic/compositional meaning intruding in the pictorial
domain comes (again, surprisingly) from quotation. If in a drawing we want to depict someone
saying something, we often add writing. A common convention, especially in comics and car-
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toons, is to use the speech balloon symbol to show who said what (4b). Similarly, a thought
bubble shows what a character is thinking (4a).2
(4) a. b.
Consider also fight clouds (5a), sound effect descriptions (5b), explosion stars, motion
lines/reduplication/blurring (5c), and what Cohn (2013) calls ‘affixes’, like the idea-lightbulb,
angry-thundercloud, stars circling over a passed out character’s head (5d), or the bulging-vein
anger symbol (5e). All of these symbols serve as conventional indicators of certain types of
events or (mental) states, significantly enriching the purely projective, pictorial meaning of the
panels in which they occur.
(5) a. b. c.
d. e.
The goal of this paper is to give a compositional semantics of speech and thought balloons,
and integrate that into a projection-based dynamic semantic account for pictorial narratives.
In the final section I share some preliminary thoughts about some of the other symbolic enrich-
ments in (5).
3 PicDRT
Following Abusch (2012) and Abusch & Rooth (2017), Maier & Bimpikou (2019) introduce
PicDRT, a rather minimal extension of standard DRT (Kamp, 1981) for wordless comics. In a
nutshell: the PicDRT construction algorithm adds the current panel in a new, labeled ‘picture
condition’, identifying the ‘regions of interest’ (corresponding to salient individuals), and tagging
these regions with fresh discourse referents. A postsemantic, pragmatic enrichment module
takes care of linking some of the newly introduced discourse referents up with already established
ones.
To illustrate, I reuse a minimal example from Maier & Bimpikou (2019), the visual analogue
of a two-sentence discourse from a well-known introduction to DRT (Geurts, 1999):
(6) a. A policeman was chasing a squirrel. He caught it.
2Obviously, none of these or any other pictures in the paper are mine. They are panel fragments taken from
googled images. These two Donald Duck panels are from an image published at https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/
2015/12/10/donald-duck-verrijkt-de-taal-1565843-a1298767.
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b.
The first picture is interpreted as adding three discourse referents: p1 representing the viewpoint
of the entire picture; and x1 and y1 representing the individuals corresponding to the two
salient picture regions (which we assume can be identified by the preliminary DRS construction
algorithm, i.e. at the level of syntax/semantics, before pragmatic reasoning). The second
picture is treated similarly, introducing three new discourse referents. After merging the two
PicDRSs we pragmatically enrich the representation by inferring that the individual depicted
in region x1 is (probably) the same as that depicted in x2, on the basis of certain plausible
assumptions about similarity, world-knowledge, temporal progression between panels and other








p1 x1 y1 p2 x2 y2
p1: p2:
x2 = x1 y2 = y1
Pragmatic enrichment need not stop here. Typical readers will view the picture sequence not
just as depicting two states of affairs in which two entities reoccur, but add that the one is a
policeman, and the second a squirrel, etc. We can add these defeasible pragmatic inferences as
additional DRS conditions on x1 and y1 in the PicDRS. We return tho descriptive enrichment
below, after we’ve introduced events.3
To interpret PicDRS boxes in a model we use an individual assignment function f to verify
the regular DRS conditions, and a viewpoint assignment v to verify the pictorial conditions.
(8) a. model: M = 〈D,W, I, V, pi〉 (where D is domain of individuals, W set of worlds, I
and interpretation function, V a set of viewpoints, and pi a projection function)
b. viewpoint assignment: v :⊂ {p1, p2, . . .} → V
c. individual assignment: f :⊂ {x1, x2, y1, . . .} → D
The semantic definition of truth for PicDRSs combines a standard DRT semantics for descriptive
conditions involving individual discourse referents, with a projective picture semantics for the
picture conditions. Since the individual discourse referents thus refer to individuals via f , but
also correspond to picture regions that refer to space-time regions via v (given pi), we must make
sure that f and v are properly ‘aligned’. Technically, this last step requires that we extend the
projection function pi to map not only worlds (seen from a viewpoint) to pictures, but also
individuals in those worlds (seen from a viewpoint) to picture regions. For concreteness we
apply here the semantics to the final, pragmatically enriched example DRS in (7).
(9) J(7)Kw,v,f = 1 iff there is a verifying embedding f ′ ⊃ f with Dom(f ′) = {x1, y1, x2, y2}
and a viewpoint assignment v′ ⊃ v with Dom(v′) = {p1, p2} such that:
a. f ′ verifies the descriptive conditions:
3Cf. Wildfeuer (2019) for a different take on the DRT modeling of pictorial narratives, without projective
picture conditions and without a distinction between semantic DRS construction and post-semantic enrichment.
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(i) f ′(x2) = f
′(x1)
(ii) f ′(y2) = f
′(y1)
b. v′ verifies the pictorial conditions:
(i) pi(w, v′(p1)) =
(ii) pi(w, v′(p2)) =
c. f ′ and v′ are aligned:
(i) pi(f ′(x1), w, v
′(p1)) =
(i.e. the policeman-region in the picture is a projective depiction of the
policeman-entity f ′(x1) in w, from the viewpoint associated with the picture)
(ii) pi(f ′(y1), w, v
′(p1)) =
(iii) pi(f ′(x2), w, v
′(p2)) =
(iv) pi(f ′(y2), w, v
′(p2)) =
4 Picturing events
Speech and thought bubbles are readily thought of as the visual language analogue of quotation
marks in written language (Saraceni, 2003; Cohn, 2013). To make this intuition precise I propose
to extend PicDRT with some Davidsonian event semantics and then apply the powerful event-
modification semantics of quotation (and reporting constructions more generally, see Kratzer
2006; Davidson 2015; Maier 2017).
Intuitively, we tend to read sequences of panels as representing sequences of events – in fact,
that is what makes it a narrative. Panels should thus be understood as depicting (and intro-
ducing appropriate discourse referents for) not just individuals, but also events. Panels thereby
become more like full-fledged utterances, which likewise introduce event discourse referents,
though there it happens compositionally, through the lexical semantics of verbs. One further
benefit of introducing events in visual narrative panels is that it’s a first step toward applying
a more general theory of discourse structure like SDRT, but for reasons of space I leave that
general extension for another occasion.
It is tempting to simply treat each panel as introducing a single (main) event discourse
referent. But it’s not hard to find counterexamples: panel sequences depicting stages of a single
event, or depicting stative scenes (without temporal progression), or single panels depicting
multiple (non-simultaneous) events (McCloud, 1993). If we look at comics with lots of dia-
logue and/or action we quickly find single panels with multiple speech and thought balloons
attaching to different characters (who may also be moving around or experiencing emotions
at the same time, perhaps indicated by further event modifiers as in (5)). One drastic option
would be to leave the introduction of event discourse referents entirely up to pragmatic enrich-
ment. Semantically speaking, the picture depicts a scene in a world, with a number of salient
individuals, and on the basis of world knowledge we may infer that some particular type of
event is probably happening. I opt for a middle position between requiring a general semantic
one-event-per-panel rule and a leave-it-to-pragmatics strategy.
I propose to link the introduction of event discourse referents to the introduction of individ-
5
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uals. Each salient individual, as identified by the DRS construction algorithm, by stipulation,
participates in some eventuality. Concretely, let’s say that the DRS construction algorithm adds
with each individual discourse referent x a new eventuality discourse referent e, and a condition
stating that x participates in e (partcpt(x, e)). On the basis of the picture, world-knowledge,
context, and rationality assumptions we may then post-semantically infer exactly what thematic
roles and what (kinds of) eventualities are depicted (agent(e, x), chase(e), slap(e),. . . ), at the
same time as we’re adding descriptive properties of the individuals (policeman(x1), batman(x)),
and adding anaphoric relations between old and new discourse referents in the case of a mul-
tipanel narrative (x2 = x1, e
′ ≺ e, . . . ). In the example below we have tow characters, which
leads the construction algorithm to introduce two associated event discourse referents. In this
case, post-semantic pragmatic reasoning might equate the two events, leaving just one event, a
slapping, with two individuals fulfilling different thematic roles (Batman the agent, Robin the
patient).
(10) ;
p x e y e′
p :
partcpt(x, e) partcpt(y, e′)
;
p x e y e′
p :
partcpt(x, e) partcpt(y, e′)
agent(e, x) e′ = e theme(e′, y) slap(e) batman(x) . . .
5 Bubbles
To deal with speech bubbles (and other symbolic enrichments exemplified in (5)) we’ll need
to decompose the panel into its (syntactic) constituents: the picture itself4 (to be intepreted
projectively, as part of a picture condition) and the bubble (to be interpreted decriptively, as a
linguistic quotation). To preserve the connection between the speech bubble and the individual
it ‘points to’ in the picture we use the discourse referent that the construction algorithm also
generates for salient picture regions. From here on let’s denote the first phase of interpretation,
the generation of a DRS representation of a panel (or meaningful sign more generally), with⟪ ⟫ (because we like to reserve J K for the second phase, i.e. the modeltheoretic interpretation
of DRSs).5
4Note that once we disentangle the speech balloon and the picture we are left with a hole in the picture.
The projective semantics needs a bit of adjustment to properly interpret holes as underspecified regions.
5The example is a fragment of a panel from https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/complex
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We analyze bubbles semantically, in the construction algorithm, as quotations, i.e. operators
that take a linguistic input, a string of letters (written inside the bubble, as a kind of infix
notation), to yield a property of individuals, viz. saying something of that form. This gives it
the right type to apply to an individual discourse referent, as needed in (11).6




b. ⟪ ⟫ = ⟪ ⟫(pGod, I hope notq) = λy.
e′
say(e′) agent(e′, y)
form(e′,pGod, I hope notq)
We can now plug (12) into (11), to get the output of the construction algorithm:
(13)




form(e′,pGod, I hope notq)
In words, the picture depicts an individual x who participates in some event e, and who is also
the agent of a speech event e′, which exhibits the linguistic form “God, I hope not”.
Note that I’ve now analyzed the speech balloon as introducing a new event discourse ref-
erent e′ of its own, rather than automatically linking to the default event associated with the
individual (stipulated in 4). Of course, this leaves open the possibility of equating the two event
variables post-semantically, pragmatically simplifying the semantic representation generated by
the construction algorithm into one where what we see is an individual who is the agent of a
particular speech event. The advantage of the current proposal is that it straightforwardly al-
lows one panel to depict a single individual with various speech balloons originating from them,
who is also participating in some salient non-linguistic activity.
Other bubble shapes conventionally encode other event properties. Cloud-like contours indi-
cate thoughts, (replace ‘say(e)’ with ‘think(e)’ in (12a), see Maier (2017) on thought quotation
more generally), bolded spiky contours indicate shouting, etc.
6For readability I freely apply lambda conversions in DRS construction derivations.
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6 Beyond bubbles
The basic analysis of verbal bubbles provided here can be further extended in various di-
rections. For instance, Cohn’s (2013) non-verbal affixes, like the aforementioned motion lines,
idea-lightbulbs, head-circling stars, or bulging vein anger symbols in (5), can be analyzed rather
similarly. In the DRS construction phase, like bubbles they are isolated from the picture to be
interpreted symbolically, as conventionally (not projectively) denoting properties of individuals,
and then they are applied to the discourse referent associated with the region they were visually
attached to.
Some of the symbolic embellishments in (5) are not obviously attached to a specific indi-
vidual. Perhaps some sound effect descriptions are better interpreted as modifiers of events,
and thus semantically applied to the event discourse referents, that are in turn introduced by
individual depictions or other symbols. Action stars and fight clouds may just introduce events,
only pragmatically linked to entities represented in the surrounding narrative (Cohn & Wit-
tenberg, 2015). Further research is required to properly analyze the various of ways in which
pictorial representations interact with symbolic enhancements.
As a final remark on thought bubbles, comics allow for the use of pictures inside bubbles
to represent an agent’s thoughts or other mental states iconically. We can model this with
our event-based semantics by generalizing the predicate ‘form(e, s)’ to take a picture as its
second argument (s). The idea is that thought events, imaginative projects, and similar mental
processes can be either linguistic or visual. If s is a picture and e a thought event, ‘form(e,s)’
means that the thought is essentially a visual experience of the worlds that are projective
mapped to the given thought bubble picture. Interestingly, the viewpoint of the thought bubble
picture need not coincide with the de se center of the experience, leading to distinction parallel
to that between free perception panels (Abusch & Rooth, 2017) and blended perception panels
(Maier & Bimpikou, 2019).
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